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382 VoELTZ v. BAKERY ETC. UNION [40 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 21660. In Bank. Mar. 10, 1953.] 
VIRGIL V. VOELTZ, Respondent, v. BAKERY AND CON-
FECTIONERY WORKERS INTERNATIONAL 
UNION OF AMERICA, LOCAI1 UNION NUMBER 37 
et al., Appellants. 
[1] Labor-Jurisdictional Strike Act-Unions Excluded.-Only a 
company union which is "financed in whole or in part, in-
terfered with, dominated or controlled by the employer" is 
excluded from consideration under the Jurisdictional Strike 
Act. (Lab. Code, §§ 1117, 1118.) 
[2] Id.-Evidence.-An implied finding that an association or-
ganized to represent plaintiff's employees was not company 
dominated is sustained by affidavits, filed on application for a 
preliminary injunction in action to enjoin defendant labor 
unions from picketing plaintiff's bakery business, that idea of 
an employee union had been discussed between at least some 
of' thP employees a year previously, and that a union of non-
supervisory employees was formed after a person who was 
experienced in labor organization problems and who was in no 
way connected with plaintiff was consulted and met with them 
at the time of organization on their invitation. 
[3] Injunctions-Preliminary Injunction-Affidavits.-Trial court 
is judge of credibility of affidavits filed on application for a 
preliminary injunction, and it is within its province to re-
solve all conflicts. 
[ 4] Labor-Jurisdictional Strike Act-Construction of Statute.-
Mere fact that a dispute existed between defendant labor 
unions and plaintiff employer prior to time that an associa-
tion to represent his employees was formed does not take 
case out of Jurisdictional Strike Act, requiring that the in-
terference with employer's business arise out of a controversy 
between unions, where after such association was formed and 
plaintiff's employees became members thereof, it endeavored 
to have defendants cease picketing and to induce plaintiff 
to bargain with it exclusively, yet defendants continued their 
concerted activities, interfering with plaintiff's business. 
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los An-
geles County granting a preliminary injunction and deny-
ing motion to vacate such injunction. W. Turney Fox, Judge. 
Affirmed. 
[4] See 5 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1945 Rev.), Labor,§ 31 et seq.; 
Am.Jur., Labor, § 178 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,4] Labor, §21; [2] Labor, §28; 
[3] Injunctions, §53. 
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Gilbert, Nissen & Irvin, Robert W. Gilbert and Clarence 
K Todd for Appellants. 
Charles 1'. Scully and 'l'obriner & Lazarus as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Appellants. 
Hyman Smith and Howard R. Harris for Respondent. 
Hotll & Baln·s as Amici Curiae on behalf of Hespondent. 
SHENK, J .-This is au appeal from an order granting a 
preliminary injunction and an order denying a motion to 
vacate that order. 
According to the complaint and affidavits viewed most 
favorably to plaintiff, it appears that plaintiff is eng·aged in 
the b nsiness of making and distributing bakery products to 
the wholesale trade, under the name Golden Krust Bakery. 
Defendants are labor unions and members thereof, the main 
ones being Bakery and Confectionery Workers' International 
Union of America, Local Union No. 37 and Bakery Drivers 
Local Union No. 276. In 1948, plaintiff employed 49 persons, 
consisting of 45 production workers, two truck drivers and 
two miscellaneous. Plaintiff sells his products to independent 
''route dealers'' who in turn sell to consumers, and to retail 
dealers in bakery products, delivery to the latter being made 
by plaintiff's trucks and the product being picked up by the 
former at plaintiff's place of business. In the latter part 
of 1948, defendants' Locals 37 and 276, commenced a cam-
paign to organize plaintiff's employees and to induce them 
to join their unions and demanded that plaintiff sign a 
contract with them making them exclusive bargaining agents 
for his employees. Plaintiff refused, because a ''substantial 
number" of his employees advised him that they would refuse 
to join the unions, and if he signed such a contract, they 
would quit. In August, 1948, it was claimed that plaintiff 
discharged one of his employees because of union membership 
and the unions filed charges with the National Labor Rela-
tions Board that such act was an unfair labor practice. I.1ater 
in November, 1948, the employee was reinstated under a 
settlement in that proceeding and plaintiff was required to 
post notices that he would discontinue such practice. De-
fendants assert that the employee was again discharged. 
In September, 1948, Local 37 filed a petition with the National 
I1abor Relations Board for certification as collective bargain-
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ing representative for plaintiff's employees. The board held 
<1 hearing and dismissed the petition on November 23, 194:-i. 
On D<>eemher 7, 1948, the nnions representing 10 of plain-
tiff's employees threatened to and did place pickets around 
plaintiff's plant, and continued to picket said plant until 
January 19, 1950, when this action was commenced; said 
n nions also called a strike of plaintiff's employees to which 
10 responded and ceased work for a week. The unions ad-
vised plaintiff on occasions between December, 1948, awl 
November, 1949, that unless he signed contracts with them 
they would destroy his business, although they knew plaintiff's 
employees were against it. The unions placed plaintiff on the 
"blacklist" as unfair to organized labor. The pickets carried 
signs stating that plaintiff was unfair to organized labor. 
Some of the pickets followed the independent route dealers to 
their customers and displayed their signs. The unions con-
taeted plaintiff's retail customers and threatened to picket 
thrm unless they ceased to buy plaintiff's products; some of 
plaintiff's customers were picketed by defendants. As a result 
of defendant unions' activities, plaintiff's customers refused 
to buy from him, to the grave injury of plaintiff's business. 
On November 19, 1949, all but two of plaintiff's then 39 
employees (the others later consented) met and formed a labor 
organization, called Golden Krust Independent Employees 
Association, to represent them. It is not controlled or domi-
nated by plaintiff. On November 21, 1949, the association 
petitioned the National I_~abor Relations Board for certification 
as exclusive· bargaining agent. It was certified as a labor 
organization but the petition to be exclusive bargainer was 
dismissed on the ground that interstate commerce was not 
affected. Discussions were had between the association and 
the unions in the latter part of December, 1949, and January, 
1950, the former requesting the latter to cease their concerted 
activities. On December 10, 1949, the association requested of 
the unions that a secret ballot election be held among plain-
tiff's employees to determine the bargaining representative. 
'l'his request was denied. The association informed plaintiff 
that if he signed a contract with the unions it would call a strike. 
'l'he trial court, in the preliminary injunction, enjoined 
defendants from picketing plaintiff's plant, representing 
that his employees are unorganized, and his products are 
made by unorganized labor. 
There is no indication that the dispute affected interstate 
eommerce, hence the I,abor Management Relations Act of 
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1947 (29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq.) is not involved. Defendants 
belatedly make the contention that the National Labor Rela-
tions Board said in one of its orders of dismissal above re-
ferred to that it did not agree with plaintiff that he was not 
engaged in interstate commerce, but it does not appear that 
such order was called to the attention of the trial court either 
before its order for the preliminary injunction or on the 
motion to vacate it. There is no allegation in the complaint or 
statement in any affidavit or defendants' answer that plaintiff 
is engaged in interstate commerce. The validity of the J urisdic.-
tional Strike Law of California (Lab. Code, § 1115 et seq.) is 
questioned, but that point was settled in Seven Up Bottling Co. 
v. Grocery Drivers Union, ante, p. 368 [254 P.2d 544]. 
Plaintiff rests his support for the injunction and the court 
granted it on the basis of the Jurisdictional Strike Law. The 
main contention of defendants, aside from the claimed in-
validity of the Jurisdictional Strike Law, is that there was no 
violation of that law, because their picketing and concerted 
activity did not arise out of a dispute between two labor 
organizations, they and the association, because the dispute 
between them and plaintiff had been in existence some 11 
months before the association was organized. Involved here-
in is the interpretation and application of sections 1117 and 
1118 of the Labor Code, reading: ''As used herein, 'labor 
organization' means any organization or any agency or em-
ployee representation committee or any local unit thereof in 
which employees participate, and exists for the purpose, in 
whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning 
grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours of employment or 
conditions of work, which labor organization is not found to be 
financed in whole or in part, interfered with, dominated or 
controlled by the employer." (§ 1117.) "As used in this 
chapter, 'jurisdictional strike' means a concerted refusal to 
perform work for an employer or any other concerted inter-
ference with an employer's operation or business, arising out 
of a controversy between two or more labor organizations as 
to which of them has or should have the exclusive right to 
bargain collectively with an employer on behalf of his em-
ployees or any of them, or arising out of a controversy be-
tween two or more labor organizations as to which of them 
has or should have the exclusive right to have its members 
perform work for an employer." ( § 1118.) 
40 C.2d-13 
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[1] Jt shonld first be observed that the defendants speak 
of the assoeiation as a "company" union, suggesting that as 
such it is e~cluded from consideration under the Jurisdictional 
Strike I,aw. But it is only a company union "financed in 
whole or in part, interfered with, dominated or controlled 
by the employer" that is excluded. (Lab. Code, § § 1117, 
1118, supra.) [2] While the evidence is conflicting, plaintiff's 
verified complaint and affidavits offered by him show the 
association not to be such an organization. Defendants claim 
that the one who organized the association was the brother of 
one of plaintiff's foremen, that some of plaintiff's supervisory 
employees attended a meeting of the association, and that 
such organizations must be carefully scrutinized, citing Mc-
Kay v. Retail A1do Salesmen's Local Union, 16 Cal.2d 311 
1106 P.2d 373]. Nevertheless, the court granted the injunction, 
thereby impliedly finding that the association was not company 
dominated, and :,;tated in its memorandum opinion: "As to de-
fendant's second contention, it cannot be said, at this stage 
of the proceed1:ngs, that the employee organization is not a 
bona fide union and that it is not free from company domina-
tion and control. It appears from the affidavits that the idea 
of an employee union has been discussed between at least some 
of the employees as early as April of last year, and that in 
November a person who was experienced in labor organization 
problems and who was in no way connected with plaintiff was 
consulted by the employees and invited to meet with them. 
Such a meeting was held on November 19th and the union of 
non-supervisory employees was formed and officers elected." 
[3] The trial court was the judge of the credibility of the 
affidavits and it was its province to resolve all conflicts. 
(Northwestern Pac. R. Co. v. Lumber&: S.W. Union, 31 Cal. 
2d 441, 443 [189 P.2d 277] .) The complaint alleged that there 
was no domination or control by plaintiff over the association 
and the affidavits submitted by him are to the same effect. 
In their argument that their concerted interference did not 
arise out of a controversy between them and another labor 
organization (Lab. Code, § 1118, S1£pra) because the con-
troversy existed prior to the formation of the association, 
they stress the assertion that the latter was an excluded 
company union. It was not, however, so far as the preliminary 
injunction is concerned, and hence the case must be treated 
as if there are two wholly independent labor organizations. 
[ 4] We do not believe that the fact that a dispute existed 
between defendants and plaintiff before the association was 
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formed and came into the picture, takes the case out of the 
act requiring that the interference with the employer's busi-
ness arise out of a controversy between unions, for after the 
association was formed and plaintiff's employees became mem-
bers thereof, it endeavored to have defendants withdraw from 
the arena and to induce plaintiff to bargain with it exclusively, 
yet defendants continued their activities, interfering with 
plaintiff's business. It may be inferred that what began as a 
<lispute betwem1 employer and the union became a dispute 
between unions as to which should be exclusive bargaining 
agent. To place defendants' construction on the act would 
make it practically never applicable, for the unions would have 
to act simultaneously in their demands or disputes with the em-
ployer before there would be an interference with the employ-
er's business arising out of a controversy between the unions 
as to which should be exclusive bargaining agent. If one of 
them made the demand any time before the other, then the in-
terference would arise out of a dispute between the employer 
and that union rather than between the unions. It would rest 
wholly within the power of the unions to arrange the chronol-
ogy of their demands, and escape the force of the act. \V e do 
not believe such an interpretation of the act is reasonable. 
'fhe orders are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, ,T., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., 
eoncurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The construction placed by the majority on the ,Juris-
dictional Strike Act will prevent a union from continuing 
to press its dispute with the employer over wages or working 
conditions whenever the employer calls in another union 
and makes the dispute jurisdictional. In my opinion it was 
not the intention of the Legislature that the act be so construed. 
The majority holds that the demand for recognition by 
the association, which was not even in existence untilll months 
after the strike began, converted the previously lawful picket-
ing within the prohibitions of the ,Jurisdictional Strike Act. 
The employer is allowed by the majority holding to enjoin 
the picketing by the union that instituted the strike, and to 
negotiate solely with the second union that subsequently ap-
peared on the scene and created the interunion conflict. The 
act cannot reasonably be interpreted to allow an injunction 
in this situation. 
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The Jurisdictional Strike Act is designed to protect em-
ployers caught between conflicting union demands. It applies 
when the dispute is not one over traditional and lawful union 
demands, such as wages and hours, but instead is over over-
lapping claims by rival unions to job opportunities. In the 
latter situation the employer is placed in a position where 
he will be subjected to picketing and economic coercion, no 
matter how willing he may be to bargain in good faith with 
either union. By outlawing aggressive union action in con-
nection with controversies between several unions over the 
exclusive right to perform work, California has followed a 
general trend in state and national legislation. 
California did not, however, go farther and give the em-
ployers more protection than the necessities of the problem 
demanded. By the phrase ''arising out of a controversy be-
tween two or more labor organizations,'' the application of 
the act is limited to cases where the forbidden concerted 
activity results from interunion disputes. It does not apply 
if the dispute is simply between an employer and a union. 
In the present case, the picketing by the Bakery Workers 
was peaceful and for a lawful purpose when it commenced on 
December 7, 1948. At that time there was no basis for in-
junctive relief. Nearly a year later, the association appeared 
on the scene and informed the employer that if he signed a 
contract with the Bakery Workers, the association would 
commence picketing. The majority opinion states that there-
after the picketing by the Bakery \Vorkers came within the 
act. But can it be seriously contended that a continuous 
course of picketing in support of a strike, existing for many 
months before the appearance of the second union, arose out 
of, resulted from, or was proximately caused by a controversy 
between the two unions~ The employer concedes that the 
picketing was lawful in its inception, but argues that he 
''obtained a remedy'' when the second labor organization 
presented a demand for recognition. The majority accepts 
this argument and gives the employer injunctive relief, not 
against the second union that interfered and subjected the 
employer to the conflicting demands, but against the first 
union, that had been picketing in support of a hitherto lawful 
strike for the purposes of gaining recognition and reinstate-
ment of a discharged union member. I have difficulty follow-
ing the reasoning that the lawful acts of the Bakery Workers 
were transformed into unlawful acts by the conduct of a 
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hostile labor organization, with which it has no affiliation or 
connection. 
Other provisions of the Jurisdictional Strike Act and the 
Labor Code would seem to reinforce the conclusion that the 
words ''arising out of a controversy between two or more 
labor organizations'' made the act inapplicable at the time 
the injunction issued. Section 1119 provides that nothing 
in the act ''shall be construed to interfere with collective 
bargaining subject to the prohibitions herein set forth.'' This 
provision is meaningless, if picketing may be prohibited when-
ever a second union makes a demand upon the employer during 
the existence of a bona fide dispute between the employer and 
the union engaged in the picketing. Absent more specific 
provisions in the act, this section prevents the act from being 
interpreted to ban concerted union action in ordinary strikes. 
(See International Labor Board v. Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 
665, 673 [71 S. Ct. 961, 95 L.Ed. 1277].) Moreover, the public 
policy of this state, as expressed in section 923 of the Labor 
Code, is that individual workers shall be free to negotiate 
the terms of their employment, and to be free from the 
interference of their employers in concerted activities for 
the purpose of collective bargaining. The decisions of this 
court make it clear that a union may use concerted action to 
g·ain objectives reasonably related to legitimate interests of or-
ganized labor. (McKay v. Retail Auto. S.L. Union, 16 Cal.2d 
311 [106 P.2d 373], and companion cases.) 
The majority supports its construction of the act on the 
ground that otherwise it would be ''practically never appli-
cable, for the unions would have to act simultaneously in their 
demands or disputes with the employer before there would 
be an interference with the employer's business arising out 
of a controversy between the unions as to which should be 
exclusive bargaining agent." 
This objection would be obviated if the act applies to the 
union that intervened in the pre-existing dispute between the 
first union and the employer. The California statute is 
significantly different from the Taft-Hartley Act, ~hich pro-
vides that when one union gains certification as the union 
which the employees wish to represent them, other unions 
cannot thereafter intervene and subject the employer to con-
flicting demands for work assignments. (Section 8 (b) ( 4) (D) ; 
see International Longshoremen's & W. Union v. Juneau 
Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237 [72 S.Ct. 235, 96 L.Ed 275]; 
Petro, Union Job-Seeking Aggression, 50 Mich.L.Rev., 497, 
390 VoELTZ v. BAKI£l~Y E'rc. UNION [40 C.2d 
fll0-520.) The California statnte dors not contain certifica-
tion proeedure, and there thtls is presented a serious problr.m 
in determining in disputes between an employer and more 
than one union whieh union is entitled to carry out con-
eerted aetivities so that employees may achieve the legitimate 
objectives of organized labor, and whieh unions are prevented 
from entering the picture and exposing an innocent em-
ployer to mutually exclusive demands by rival unions. The 
majority resolves this difficulty by applying the statute to all 
unions making claims for the right to represent the employees, 
regardless of the prior history of disputes and contraets be-
tween the employer and the union first representing, or claim-
ing to represent, the employees. :F'urther, as I read the ma-
jority opinion, there is no requirement that the unions in fact 
represent any of the employees: all that is required is that 
more than one union claim the right to represent them. The 
majority vvould thus allow the employer either to contract 
with the union that offers the best terms and obtain injunctive 
relief against other unions making more unpalatable requests, 
or, so long as two rival unions are present, to enjoin picketing 
by both unions and gain perpetual freedom from concerted 
labor action. To protect employers from demands by more 
than one union, the majority gives the right to ban picketing 
by all unions, even though one union may have represented 
the employees for many years. 
'l'he express languag·e of the act does not support the fore-
going construction. As we have already seen, the words 
''arising out of a controversy between two or more labor 
organizations'' prevent the statute from being applied to the 
union that originally began picketing for a lawful purpose. 
Concededly, however, unless the statute is meaningless, the 
employer must be entitled to some type of injunctive relief in 
order to eliminate jurisdictional demands from the picketing 
and confine the dispute to one over traditional lawful union 
objectives. The employer will be fully protected and the 
purposes of the act carried out by giving him relief against the 
demand by the second union. An ordinary strike between 
a single union and an employer does not ''arise out'' of a 
dispute between two unions, and the act thus does not apply 
to picketing arising out of renewal of a collective bargaining 
agreement or out of an organizational strike when no other 
nnion is simultaneously making a claim that it should represent 
the employees. On the other hand, when an employer either 
has a contract with one union, or is engaged in a strike with 
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a union, and a second union intervenes and makes demands 
for job rights that conflict with the demands of the first 
union, the controversy between the second union and the 
employer would appear to be one "arising out of" a jurisdic-
i ional conflict between the two unions. The action of the 
second union puts the employer in a position where he would 
face economic pressure whether he acceded to the demands 
of the first union, or rejected them and accepted those of the 
second union. The first union, however, did nothing different 
from what it had been doing before the second union appeared 
and, as to the first union, the picketing would, therefore, still 
''arise out of'' the original dispute with the employer. Since 
the only reason there is any conflict between two unions over 
job rights is the interference of the second union, it would 
seem to follow that the employer is entitled to prevent the 
second nnion from concerted interference with his business, 
but that the first union is not within the prohibitions of the act. 
The act as a whole is aimed at preventing a union from 
interfering with another union which has a dispute with 
the employer-to prevent the latter union from creating a 
situation where the employer is faced with demands from 
both unions for exclusive representation rights. It is, there-
fore, the latter union which should be enjoined from its 
activities because it is in the wrong. This is recognized by 
the act when it provides that "any person" injured or 
thrratened with injury by a violation of the act may obtain 
injunctive relief. (Lab. Code, § 1116.) "Person" includes 
a labor organization. (Ibid.,§ 1117.) 'rhus the nnion engaged 
in a dispute with the employrr should be entitled to have 
the interfering union restrained from concerted activity on 
thr gTound that snch activity merely creates an ilhmory 
jurisdictional strike where none exists. 
Thr orders should be reversed. 
Traynor, J., concurred. 
Appellants' pctitioll for a rehearing was denied April 2, 
l9fi8. Carter, ,f., and 'l'raynor, .T., were of the opinion that the 
petition shonld be granted. 
